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Abstract 
 
This paper evaluates the effect of a recent change to unemployment benefit in the UK 
requiring both partners in a couple (rather than just one) to search for work.  The 
difference-in-differences estimator is extended in two ways.  First, variations in when the 
change was implemented are exploited to test and adjust for bias resulting from 
differential trends among the comparison group.  Second, the approach is combined with 
matching to relax functional form restrictions.  After some months, positive effects on 
benefit exit were detected but effects on job entry were less apparent.  Mostly, the effect 
operated through the female partner. 
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Unemployed couples: the labour market effects of making both 
partners search for work 
 
Introduction 
 
For many years, the unemployed have been the main focus of employment policy in the 
UK.  As an illustration of this, active labour market programmes have traditionally 
focused almost exclusively on encouraging individuals to move from unemployment into 
work.  More recently, there has been increased emphasis on the economically inactive.  
Lone parents, the disabled and partners of benefit claimants have all been targeted by 
‘New Deals’, the principal form of active labour market programme in the UK.   
 
In addition to these voluntary programmes, a change to the legislation surrounding 
unemployment benefit claims for certain couples was introduced in March 2001.  
Whereas previously only one partner within a couple was required to look for work, the 
change in legislation now required both partners to do so or be faced with benefit 
sanctions.  This paper considers what effect this has had.  In particular, the interest is in 
the effect that it has had on newly-unemployed couples. 
 
The evaluation is based on a difference-in-differences (DiD) approach.  However, there 
are two significant extensions to this.  The first exploits the fact that there were variations 
in how soon the legislation was implemented in practice.  These delays were unintended 
and varied in length both within and between local offices.  They offer the possibility of 
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testing the assumptions underlying the DiD approach in a similar spirit to the pre-
programme tests of Heckman and Hotz (1989). Such a test can provide a reassurance as 
to the suitability of the comparison group.  Clearly, this is a crucial consideration since 
the DiD approach relies on this suitability for identification of the effect.  Moreover, the 
results of the test are used to adjust the DiD estimator to take account of possible biases 
introduced by inadequacies of the comparison group.   
 
The second adaptation is to combine the DiD approach with propensity score matching.  
This has the advantage that some of the functional form restrictions inherent in linear 
models are avoided, and the possible problems associated with changes in the 
composition of the treatment group can be addressed.  These points are discussed further 
below.  The estimation results contribute to the still very small empirical literature on this 
approach, particularly when the data used are repeat cross-section rather than 
longitudinal. 
 
The results suggest that the effects of the legislation took some time to materialise but 
that, about five months after its introduction, Joint Claims was acting to encourage 
couples to exit benefit.  It seems likely that administrative complications associated with 
the introduction of the legislation were responsible for the delay in observing an effect.  
The employment effects were less evident although it appears that these were beginning 
to emerge.  Furthermore, it seems that where the legislation had encouraged the couple to 
exit worklessness, this had been mostly due to the female partner finding work.   
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The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  In section I, the institutional framework 
is set out.  This provides an overview of the unemployment benefit regime in the UK 
along with an account of trends in worklessness which provided the impetus for the 
legislation.  The economic and econometric frameworks are set out in Section II.  The 
data are described in Section III.  Section IV presents the main results and Section V 
concludes.  
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I. CONTEXT FOR THE LEGISLATION 
 
The main form of unemployment benefit in the UK is Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA).  It is 
payable once a fortnight and in the 2001/2 tax year amounted to £42 per week for those 
aged 18-24 without dependent children.  For couples, the amount payable was roughly 
double at £83.25 (if both partners are aged over 18). It is essentially payable for an 
unlimited period, although during certain employment programmes (for example, the 
New Deal for Young People) it may be replaced with an allowance of equal value.  This 
is essentially an administrative artefact and the JSA payment resumes upon exiting the 
programme for those unsuccessful in finding work.  
 
Receipt of JSA is conditional on actively seeking and being available for work.  Failure 
to satisfy these requirements can result in withdrawal of benefit.  Historically, for couples 
dependent on JSA, there was a distinction between the claimant and the non-claimant 
partner.  Only the claimant partner was obliged to meet the labour market requirements; 
nothing was expected of the other partner. However, legislation introduced on 19 March 
2001 changed this for certain couples. The distinction between claimant and non-claimant 
partner was removed and both were now required to actively seek and be available for 
work.  Importantly, not all couples were affected.  Specifically, only those couples with 
no dependent children and where at least one partner was aged over 18 and born after 19 
March 1976 were affected.  At the time of introduction, this age criterion translated into 
those couples with at least one partner aged between 18 and 24 years.   
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The new arrangement was titled ‘Joint Claims for JSA’ (hereafter, ‘Joint Claims’) and 
was introduced with the specific aim of addressing the problem of workless households.  
Giving equal status to both partners means that the job search assistance provided to JSA 
claimants is now extended to both partners in a Joint Claims couple.  It also extended the 
threat of sanctions for those not complying with their obligations.  The combined effect is 
intended to bring a group of individuals closer to the labour market with the aim of 
increasing the chances of a couple finding employment and leaving benefit.  
 
As noted, Joint Claims was introduced to address the growth in workless households in 
the UK.  Over the last thirty years, there has been an increased tendency for households 
to be either ‘work-rich’ (all adults in work) or ‘work-poor’ (no adults in work) with the 
intermediate status of a mix between working and non-working adults becoming 
increasingly rare.  As a dramatic illustration of this, Gregg et al. (1999) showed that the 
proportion of households with nobody in work almost tripled from a level of 6.5 per cent 
in 1975 to 17.9 per cent in 1998.  Going back further, the rates are even lower.  Over the 
same period, the proportion of households where all adults were in work rose from 56 per 
cent to 63 per cent.  In 1996 the UK had the fourth highest rate of workless households 
out of all the OECD countries.  The level of polarisation was higher than in any OECD 
country.  All this is set against the backdrop of the lowest level of unemployment in the 
UK for more than twenty years. 
 
There are reasons why this is an important development.  From the macroeconomic 
perspective, received wisdom suggests there is a relationship between the extent to which 
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unemployment is concentrated among certain groups and the extent to which it is 
effective in reducing wage pressure (Layard et al., 1991).  Hence, an even spread of 
unemployment maximises its inflation-quelling efficiency.  There are also concerns at the 
household and individual level.  Earnings are the main generator of wealth and 
households without work are more likely to be poor.  In 1996 some 70 per cent of 
workless households had less than half mean household income.  Furthermore, 
unemployment can have scarring effects.  Gregg (2001) shows that British men 
experiencing unemployment  when young are likely to endure long-term labour market 
disadvantage as a result.  Arulampalam (2001) and Gregory and Jukes (2001) show that 
this scarring effect is also evident when considering wages: unemployment imposes a 
penalty on future earnings. 
 
An obvious question to ask is why this increase in worklessness arose.  One possibility is 
that it simply reflects a demographic change.  The increased prevalence of single adult 
households will, by definition, increase polarisation.  However, this only accounts for a 
fraction of the trend that has been seen.  Dickens et al. (2000) show that only a third of 
the observed polarisation can be explained by changing household composition.  The 
bulk of observed polarisation is accounted for by different underlying factors.  This is 
clear when considering a single type of household.  For couples, 10.4 per cent of those 
without children and 7.5 per cent of those with children were workless in 1996.  This 
represents a huge rise on the corresponding proportions in 1968: 2.7 and 1.6 per cent 
respectively (Gregg et al., 1999). 
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Some further insight is possible.  Two notable labour market trends over the past twenty 
or so years have been the increase in female participation and the increase in male 
inactivity.  If these transitions do not take place in tandem within the household, 
increased polarisation must result.  Further examination of the trends shows that, despite 
the overall rise in women’s employment, there has been little change for those partnered 
with jobless men (Desai et al., 1999).  Almost all the increase has been among those with 
working partners.  The main increases in male inactivity, on the other hand, have been 
among those aged over 50.  Taken together, these trends are unlikely to both be found 
within a single household.  Consequently, polarisation has resulted. 
 
 
 
II. THE ECONOMIC AND ECONOMETRIC FRAMEWORK 
 
Economic background 
 
Economic theory suggests that secondary earners within a household are more likely to 
seek work if the primary worker becomes unemployed.  This is the ‘added worker’ effect 
(AWE) and it operates through two channels.  First, assuming leisure to be a normal 
good, the income effect associated with the drop in household income increases the 
likelihood of participation for other household members.  Second, there is a substitution 
effect since the primary worker’s nonmarket time can be substituted for that of the 
secondary worker. 
 10
 However, empirical studies in the U.S. have struggled to find evidence of such an effect 
(for example, Speltzer, 1997; Maloney, 1991).  There are a number of reasons why this 
may be unsurprising.  First, preferences for work among partners of those who become 
unemployed may differ from partners of those who do not become unemployed.  Second, 
if the job loss resulted from a general worsening of economic conditions, the employment 
prospects of the dependent partner may be similarly affected.  This is the ‘discouraged 
worker effect’.  Related to these two points is the possibility that, due to assortative 
mating, partners share similar labour market characteristics.  Hence, difficulties 
experienced in finding work are likely to be shared by both partners.  Theoretically, while 
the direction of the AWE will remain the same, the reasons listed above may mean that it 
is smaller and more difficult to detect. 
 
The situation in the UK is no different.  Davies et al. (1992) show that wives of 
unemployed men are less likely to be employed than wives of employed men and suggest 
the assortative mating argument may carry the most explanatory weight for this.  An 
insight into the dynamics of the relationship is provided by Pudney and Thomas (1992), 
who consider the labour market transitions made by the wives of men who had entered 
unemployment nine months earlier.  Their results suggest that the effect of the husband 
losing his job is a large drop in his wife’s desire to participate in the labour market.  
While demographic characteristics appeared to be the dominant influence on wives’ 
participation, evidence of strong complementarity between the leisure of husbands and 
wives was found. 
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 Another possibility is that the social security system acts as a disincentive for married 
women to engage in paid employment when their husbands are unemployed (see, for 
example, Kell and Wright, 1990).   Essentially, spousal labour supply can be viewed as 
insurance against unemployment (Ashenfelter, 1980; Heckman and MaCurdy, 1980; 
Lundberg, 1985).  However, welfare benefits themselves may serve to mitigate against 
the added worker effect as they lessen the income effect of job loss.  Cullen and Gruber 
(2000) find strong evidence in the USA supporting the view that unemployment 
insurance crowds out spousal labour supply.  The change to the unemployment benefit 
legislation considered in this paper can be seen as an attempt to address this crowding-out 
effect.  The secondary worker is encouraged to look for work with the threat of benefit 
withdrawal for non-compliance.  
 
Econometric framework 
 
This evaluation proceeds using a difference-in-differences (DiD) approach (see, for 
example, Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999).  The policy change is viewed as a natural 
experiment and the aim of the analysis is to estimate how outcomes for those affected by 
the introduction of the legislation differ from what they would have been had the 
legislation not been introduced.  The resulting parameter is the average effect of 
treatment on the treated and, in the DiD framework, is identified by comparing changes 
in the treatment group with changes over a similar time period among a group of non-
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treated individuals who are in some sense comparable.  More will be said about the 
nature of this comparability below. 
 
The properties of the DiD estimator are well-known.  In this evaluation, participation is 
mandatory so for an outcome Y and  exogenous variables X, and assuming the policy 
change to take place at time 0, the relationship of interest can be written: 
 
(1) Yit = Xit β + dit α + Uit 
 
where i indexes the individual, t is a time subscript, dit is an indicator taking value 1 for 
the eligible group when t>0, 0 otherwise.  The parameter of interest is α.  Since 
participation is mandatory for those in the eligible group, dit is sufficient to denote 
treatment for those in the eligible group.   
 
Uit is assumed to have the following components: 
 
(2) Uit = φi + θt + µit 
 
where φi is the individual fixed effect, θt is a common temporal effect and µit is an 
individual time-varying error independent of X and the other error components. The DiD 
estimator requires observations both before and after the intervention for both the 
treatment group and a comparison group.  First differencing removes the fixed effects and 
differencing across the treatment and comparison groups removes the trend effects, 
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yielding the desired parameter.  Abstracting from regressors apart from the treatment 
indicator, the estimator can be written: 
 
(3) 
∧α DiD = ( −Y tT  - −Y τT ) - ( −Y tC  - −Y τC ) 
 
where the superscripts T and C denote treatment and comparison groups respectively and 
t and τ are time subscripts such that τ<0<t.  The success of this approach relies on three 
key assumptions.  First, the differenced temporal individual-specific effects must be 
independent of the participation decision.  Writing 
 
(4) E (
∧α DiD ) =  α + E ( µit – µiτ | d=1 ) - E ( µit – µiτ | d=0 ) ,  
 
it is clear that unless the two expectation terms on the right hand side are identical (the 
constant bias assumption), the resulting estimator will be biased (Ashenfelter, 1978; 
Heckman and Smith, 1999).  A scenario often used to illustrate the possibility of such a 
bias is the case of individuals participating in a training programme.  Should enrolment in 
the programme be more likely following a temporary pre-programme dip in earnings, the 
DiD estimator will overstate the effect of the programme since higher earnings would be 
expected among the treated even without participating (assuming earnings to be mean-
reverting).  In the context of mandatory participation this is less of a concern than it 
would be for a voluntary programme.   
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The second assumption is that the temporal effect is common to both the treatment and 
the comparison group.  If instead 
 
(5) E(Uit| dit ) = E(φi | dit ) + kgθt  
 
where kg represents the differential temporal effects, the DiD estimator will identify 
 
(6) E(
∧α DiD) = α  + (kT  - kC )(θt - θτ) 
 
which will not in general recover the true effect.  Heckman and Hotz (1989) recommend 
the use of pre-programme tests to investigate whether significant effects are (erroneously) 
detected before the programme takes place.  In this application, sufficient data are not 
available to do this so a different test was used.  This test makes use of the fact that there 
was variation in practice in when the new legislation was adopted.  Such variation may 
have been due to efficiency variations across local offices or to variations across 
individuals in how straightforward their claim was to accommodate within the new 
system.  In fact, the new system was running concurrently with the old system for some 
months.  As will be discussed below, this variation, which was not an intended feature of 
the introduction of the legislation, can be exploited to refine estimates of the treatment 
effect.  The effect of interest is that relating to those who had converted to the new 
system (the ‘converted’).   However, a contemporaneous effect, using the same 
comparison group, can be estimated for those whose claims were still subject to the pre-
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Joint Claims rules - the ‘unconverted’.  An insignificant effect for the unconverted would 
suggest that the macro trends are similar across the treatment and comparison groups. 
 
The third assumption is that the composition of the treatment group remains unchanged 
following the intervention.  This may be more of a problem when using repeat cross-
section data as in this evaluation than when using panel data, although systematic attrition 
in panel data can be equally damaging.  As will be discussed below, matching can be 
helpful in addressing the potential change in sample composition. 
 
Adjusting the linear DiD model for differential trends in the comparison group 
 
As mentioned earlier, two extensions to the linear DiD model were considered.  The first 
adjusts for the possibility of a differential trend across the treatment and comparison 
groups.  Bell et al. (1999) address this point.  Intuitively, their approach corrects for the 
possibility of differential trends by controlling for an effect estimated by DiD for a 
hypothetical treatment before the true treatment.1  Implicit in this is the assumption of 
zero effect in the pre-treatment period.  The choice of timing for the hypothetical 
treatment is important since it should relate to a period over which a similar macro trend 
has occurred so that the (kT  - kC )(θt1 - θt-1) term can be differenced out.  Abstracting 
from regressors other than the treatment variable, their trend-adjusted estimator takes the 
form 
 
                                                 
1 The trend-adjusted estimator is also the random growth model of, for example, Heckman and Hotz 
(1989). 
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(7) 
∧α TADiD = [ ( −Y tT  - −Y τT ) - ( −Y tC  - −Y τC ) ] - [ ( −Y τ**T  - −Y τ*T ) - ( −Y τ**C  - −Y τ*C ) ] 
 
where t denotes a post intervention period and τ* < τ**<τ denote pre intervention 
periods.2   
 
In this paper, an analogous estimator is derived by controlling for differential trends 
between the unconverted couples and those in the comparison group.  That is, assuming 
the unconverted  couples can be regarded as representing how the converted couples 
would have fared had Joint Claims not been introduced, effects estimated using the 
unconverted and the comparison group should be insignificant if the comparison group is 
satisfactory.  If significant effects are detected, these can be used as a measure of bias by 
which to adjust the estimates for converted couples.  A strength of this approach is that 
the bias estimate is contemporaneous to the estimates for the converted couples and is 
therefore subject to identical macro trends. 
 
Algebraically, this conversion-adjusted DiD can be written: 
 
(8) 
∧α CADiD = [ ( −Y tTC  - −Y τTC ) - ( −Y tC  - −Y τC ) ] - [ ( −Y tTU  - −Y τTC ) - ( −Y tC  - −Y τC ) ] 
 
                                                 
2 Equation (7) requires four periods of data.  Alternatively, it could be estimated using three periods of data 
if τ** = τ.  This is the approach adopted in Heckman and Hotz (1989). 
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where TC denotes treatment group members whose claims have been converted and TU 
denotes treatment group members whose claims are unconverted.  Clearly, this simplifies 
to  
 
(9) 
∧α CADiD =  ( −Y tTC  - −Y τTC ) -  ( −Y tTU  - −Y τTC ) = −Y tTC  -  −Y tTU  
 
which removes altogether the need for a comparison group or any pre-intervention 
observations.  In fact, this simplification is obvious if the conversion process is 
considered random (conditional on observables) – the comparison of means is the same 
approach that would be used with experimental data.  However, the formulation in (8) is 
useful since the first bracketed term on the right hand side represents the estimated 
unadjusted effect and the second bracketed term provides a test of the suitability of the 
comparison group.  Furthermore, when controlling for X in a regression, (8) and (9) will 
yield different results since the conditioning is through the means of the treatment and 
comparison members combined in (8) but only the treatment group in (9). 
 
Combining DiD with propensity score matching 
 
The second extension is to combine DiD with propensity score matching.  This 
combination has become popular in empirical research (see, for example, Heckman et al. 
(1998) or Blundell et al. (2001) for an application to the UK) although I am aware of only 
one paper which applies it to the case of repeat cross section data rather than panel data – 
Eichler and Lechner (2002).  This approach avoids the functional form restrictions on 
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observable characteristics inherent in parametric approaches.  However, the error 
components are restricted by functional form in the way already discussed, hence the 
resulting estimator cannot be regarded as fully nonparametric.3  Furthermore, while the 
constant bias assumption underlying matched DiD is not weaker than the identifying 
assumption for matching (the conditional independence assumption, CIA), it is plausible 
to believe that in this application it is more likely to be satisfied.  This is considered 
below. 
 
The CIA (Rubin, 1977) can be expressed: 
 
(10) Y0  D | X = x C
 
where Y0 is the potential outcome associated with non-treatment and C  denotes 
independence.  This is undermined should the decision to participate be influenced by 
unobserved factors likely to determine outcomes.  The data available for this evaluation is 
not rich enough to observe all influences on participation and outcomes.  Hence, 
matching estimates are likely to be biased and another identification strategy is required.  
Combining matching with DiD allows for unobserved influences on participation, so long 
as these are either individual fixed effects or common trend effects.  As noted earlier, 
voluntary training programmes provide an example of when this assumption may not be 
met since the temporary pre-programme dip implies a greater change in µ for those 
receiving treatment.  However, when considering a compulsory programme such as Joint 
                                                 
3 In fact, propensity score matching cannot be regarded as fully nonparametric when it uses a parametric 
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Claims there is less scope for µ to influence participation.  The identifying assumption 
can be written: 
 
(11) µit - µiτ  D | X = x.  C
 
This is the constant bias assumption referred to earlier and, if it holds, the comparison 
group outcomes evolve in the same way the treatments would have had they not 
participated (Blundell and Dias, 2000; Eichler and Lechner, 2002).  Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1983) showed that the vector of attributes, X, could be replaced with 
P(X)=P(D=1|X=x), the probability of receiving treatment, or propensity score.  Hence, 
the identifying assumption becomes: 
 
(12) µit - µiτ  D | P(X) = P(x).  C
 
Under this approach, the average effect of treatment on the treated can be estimated as 
 
(13) 
∧α MDiD = [ (Y∑
=∈ }1{ idi
it - Yj(i) τ )- ( Yk(i)t - Yl(i)τ ) ] / NT 
 
where the j(i), k(i) and l(i) subscripts denote observations j, k and l respectively used as 
comparators for observation i and where NT is the number of treated couples.  
Alternatively: 
                                                                                                                                                 
model to estimate the propensity score. 
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 (14) E(
∧α MDiD) =  E ( Yt | X, d=1) –  
E { E ( Yt | X, d=0) – [ E ( Yτ | X, d=1) – E ( Yτ | X, d=0) ] | d=1 }. 
 
 
Under this formulation, matching is performed three times.  Specifically, each treated 
individual is matched to post-intervention comparison group members and to pre-
intervention treatment and comparison group members.  This is a different approach from 
that of Eichler and Lechner (2002).  In their analysis, the treated are matched to the non-
treated before participation in the programme to yield an estimated pre-treatment effect.  
An analogous procedure after participation provides a post-treatment effect.  The overall 
effect is estimated as the difference between these two estimates.  In this paper, the 
matching approach ensures that observable characteristics before and after the 
introduction of Joint Claims are balanced for both the treatment and comparison groups.  
This controls for compositional change over time and therefore represents an 
improvement to the Eichler and Lechner approach.  It has already been shown that 
compositional changes can undermine DiD estimates.  Maintaining the sample 
composition in this way is most obvious with single nearest-neighbour matching (implied 
by equation (13)).  A related point is that matching balances observable characteristics 
across the treated and the non-treated, thereby helping ensure that the comparison group 
provides a suitable counterfactual for the treated.   
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A note on heterogeneity 
 
For ease of exposition, the assumption implicit in equation (1) is of a treatment effect that 
is common across all couples.  This is unlikely to be valid.  A more realistic model is  
 
(1a) Yit = Xit β + dit αi + Uit 
 
which allows for heterogeneous treatment effects.  In this more general scenario, there is 
a distinction between the average effect of treatment on the treated and the average 
treatment effect for the population.  Only the former is identifiable under DiD (see, for 
example, Blundell and Dias, 2000).  The estimators considered in this section are all 
based on DiD and can therefore recover this parameter but not the population impact. 
 
 
III. THE DATA AND THE ELIGIBLE GROUP CONSIDERED 
 
The evaluation uses administrative records of couples claiming JSA.  While not as rich as 
survey data, the clear advantage of administrative data is that they allow estimates to be 
based on the full population of claimants.  More specifically, all couples meeting the age 
criteria for eligibility and without dependent children are observed.  These couples 
comprise the eligible group.  Those eligible after the introduction of the legislation and 
whose claims had been subject to the new rules from the outset are regarded as receiving 
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the ‘treatment’.4  These are the ‘converted’ cases mentioned already.  Unconverted cases 
comprise all those eligible couples who, by the time of the outcome variable in question, 
were still subject to the former system.  In addition, a comparison group of couples was 
observed.  These couples are also without dependent children but do not meet the age 
criteria.  To be included in the comparison group, neither partner could satisfy the age 
criteria for the legislation, but at least one partner had to be aged between 27 and 35 
years.   
 
The dataset was constructed as a series of snapshots of the population.  These are referred 
to as ‘scans’ in the remainder of this paper.  Figure 1 gives an impression of the changing 
numbers of couples eligible for Joint Claims.  From a peak of 9,500 in January 2001, 
there was a gentle decline of about 1,000 couples to a level that has remained broadly 
stable since May 2001.  The slight dip in numbers in the summer months suggests some 
seasonal variation, although without a longer run of data it is not possible to be more 
definite about this.  The timing of the beginning of the decline is consistent with the 
introduction of Joint Claims in March 2001.  It is also worth noting that any decline 
would have been offset to some extent due to the fact that eligibility is set with reference 
to a birth date of 19 March 1976.  A consequence of this is that the eligible age group 
expands naturally with time.  At the time of its introduction, Joint Claims only related to 
couples where at least one partner was between the ages of 18 and 24 years but, one year 
later, those aged between 18 and 25 years were affected. 
 
                                                 
4 This is to avoid the complications arising from couples who began their claim under the old system and 
converted part way through. 
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< FIGURE 1 HERE > 
 
In trying to evaluate the effect of Joint Claims, it is important to be aware of its possible 
effects.  These are twofold.  First, there is the ‘direct’ effect – the extent to which the 
economic behaviour of joint claimant couples is affected by the changed JSA 
environment brought about by the introduction of the legislation.  This is the focus of this 
paper.  Second, there is the ‘deterrent’ effect.  It may be that one consequence of Joint 
Claims is that couples take action in order to avoid its requirements.  As an example of 
this, consider the case of a sole-earner couple faced with imminent job-loss.  Pre-Joint 
Claims, a spell claiming JSA might have ensued until finding a new job.  Post-Joint 
Claims, should the aversion to the idea of both partners having to look for work be 
sufficiently strong, there may be increased job search effort in order to avoid this, 
possibly resulting in avoiding a spell claiming JSA.  
 
It is not possible to observe the deterrent effect operating in this way on couples in work.  
This is because such couples cannot be observed in unemployment records.  All that can 
be estimated for couples entering Joint Claims (the flow) is the direct effect.  However, 
those couples who were eligible for Joint Claims at the time of its introduction (the stock) 
are recorded in unemployment records, and for them both deterrent effects and direct 
effects may be important influences on exits.  One important reason for a deterrent effect 
among the stock, for which some anecdotal evidence exists, is the increased difficulty of 
fraudulently claiming for a non-existent partner due to the Joint Claims requirement for 
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both partners to attend interviews at the job centre.  The decline shown in Figure 1 in the 
numbers claiming is consistent with the existence of a deterrent effect. 
 
In this paper, only the flow is considered.  The main reason for this is that flow effects are 
a better guide to the long-run equilibrium effects of Joint Claims.  That is, over time the 
stock will deplete and the population of Joint Claims couples will increasingly assume 
the characteristics of the flow.  These characteristics can differ substantially from those of 
the stock who by definition have longer experiences of unemployment.  A further 
complication with considering the stock is that it is difficult to separate the deterrent 
effect from the direct effect.  With the flow, only the undeterred are observed in the data; 
all identified effects are direct effects. 
 
The flow is taken to comprise all couples who, at the time of each scan, had been 
unemployed for up to one month.  Since the scans cover a number of points in time, it is 
possible to examine the extent to which outcomes of interest evolve over time.  Figure 2 
provides an example of one such outcome; the proportion of couples captured in a 
particular scan who remain unemployed three months later.   
 
< FIGURE 2 HERE > 
 
In this chart, three lines appear.  The solid line shows the change over time for the 
converted cases.  The unconverted cases are shown by the dashed line while the dotted 
line shows the trend for the comparison group.  It can be seen that up to three months 
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before the introduction of the legislation (in March 2001), the converted and the 
unconverted follow the same path.  A number of further points are evident.  Before the 
introduction of the legislation, there is little difference between the treatment and the 
comparison couples in the probability of being unemployed three months hence.  After 
the introduction, the converted couples initially appear to be more likely than the 
comparison couples to remain unemployed.  However, from about June 2001 onwards, 
the situation for converted couples had improved to the extent that they were now less 
likely than those in the comparison group to remain unemployed for three months or 
longer.  Hence, the impression created from this chart is that the intervention took a few 
months to take effect but then had a positive effect on unemployment exits. 
 
The other important point from this chart is that the trend for unconverted couples 
follows that of the comparison couples quite closely.  Assuming that the conversion 
process is random and that unconverted couples can be regarded as providing a 
counterfactual case to converted couples, this similarity is reassuring since it suggests 
that the comparison group successfully shadows the trend among the treatment group. 
 
Given this distinction between converted and unconverted treatment group couples, it is 
instructive to inspect the degree to which there is variation in their characteristics.  Were 
the process random, one would expect them to be very similar.  Table 1 considers the 
April 30 2001 scan and shows the profile of those who had converted by this time to be 
very similar to those who had not converted.  No statistical difference was evident for 
ethnic group, region of residence or rurality of residence.  Some differences in age were 
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detected which were significant at conventional levels, although these were small in 
magnitude.  Preferred occupation was also found to differ significantly yet again the 
differences were not large.  Most notably, there was a significant difference in the 
proportion disabled (for partner 1).  The fact that many more unconverted appear to be 
disabled may be explained by the fact that disabled individuals may be eligible for 
exemption if they are not able to fulfil the labour market requirements of seeking and 
being available for work.  Consequently, their conversion could be delayed pending 
further consideration.   
 
< TABLE 1 HERE > 
 
Overall, it is not valid to regard the conversion process as random since some significant 
differences are apparent.  This precludes use of the simple evaluation techniques possible 
with experimental data.  However, the differences are not substantial on the whole and, 
furthermore, can be controlled for where observed.  The key point is that the policy 
intention was to bring the legislation into effect at the same time in all areas and across 
all clients.  Any variation to this intention arose in an unpredictable manner.  Since delays 
at the individual level would vary with those client characteristics known to and recorded 
by the local officer, it is likely that administrative data contains sufficient information to 
explain reasons for delays in conversion.  In view of this, it appears plausible to exploit 
the variations in conversion to aid identification of the treatment effect, controlling for 
observed differences as appropriate. 
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 IV. ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS 
 
The first results presented (Table 2) are those for the standard regression-adjusted DiD 
estimator.  Since these results are presented in a similar way to subsequent results, some 
explanation of the format is provided below.   
 
Two scans are needed to get these DiD estimates; one before and one after the 
intervention.  The dates of the ‘before’ scans are given in the leftmost column of Table 2.  
Four such scans are considered: September, November and December 2000 and January 
2001.5  Five ‘after’ scans are considered and these are detailed at the top of each column: 
one in April, two in June, one in August and one in September 2001.  The outcome 
measure considered is whether the couple were still claiming JSA at some point after the 
scan dates.  Six points were considered: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 months after the scan date.  
The entry in each cell represents the estimate of the effect of Joint Claims on exits from 
unemployment.  More specifically, they represent percentage point differences.  Finally, 
a number of cells are empty.  This indicates that the outcome measure in question relates 
to a point in time for which unemployment information was not available at the time of 
writing (information was only available up to mid-November 2001).  The other reason for 
cells being empty is that the outcome measure in question in the ‘before’ period would 
span the introduction of Joint Claims, making it difficult to identify a clear effect. 
                                                 
5 Hamermesh (2000) suggests that if estimates are robust to varying the pre-intervention period, it is more 
plausible to assume that the bias is stable.  Since in this analysis the periods are quite close together, there 
is more reason to believe the bias to be stable. 
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 < TABLE 2 HERE > 
 
Presented in this way, only the effect of Joint Claims itself is shown.  However, the 
models used to obtain these results included a number of other variables that may have 
affected transitions away from unemployment.  Such factors as age, ethnicity, preferred 
occupation, disability, JSA history, region, rurality and the local unemployment rate may 
be thought to influence outcomes and these were controlled for in the model.  It is not 
practical to present these results in full (Table 2, for example, summarises the results of 
54 separate estimations).   
 
The overall impression from inspecting Table 2 is that the effect matured over time, 
eventually achieving the intended effect of encouraging benefit exit.  Considering 
unemployment exits over the first three months, there is broad consistency across the 
‘before’ scans.  It is not until the August and September ‘after’ scans that a relatively 
stable position is reached.  The early effects on longer-term unemployment appear 
perverse.  More specifically, the results suggest couples were now more likely to remain 
on JSA in the longer-term. 
 
< TABLE 3 HERE > 
 
However, these results take no account of the suitability of the comparison group.  Table 
3 gives the estimated DiD effects for the unconverted cases.  The results suggest that, on 
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the whole, the comparison group performed well in providing a counterfactual for the 
treatment group trends.  In almost all cases the estimated effect is statistically 
insignificant.  There are two instances where this was violated.  Therefore, to address the 
possibility of the results in Table 2 being biased due to an inappropriate comparison 
group, the unconverted results (Table 3) can be deducted from the converted results 
(Table 2).  Table 4 shows the results of doing this. 
 
< TABLE 4 HERE > 
 
Adjusting for the comparison group in this way does not alter the overall impression 
gained from the simple DiD estimates but it does make clearer the evolution of the effect.  
In particular, it appears that there is less variation across the ‘before’ scans in the 
estimated effects for any given ‘after’ scan.  Summarising the results rather boldly, it 
appears that the effects on short-term unemployment are in the region of 10 percentage 
points by the time of the August ‘after’ scan and roughly 15 percentage points by the time 
of the September scan.  Hence, the evidence suggests an evolving Joint Claims effect; 
after an initial period of ineffectiveness, about five months after its introduction its 
influence on JSA exits could be observed.  Third, the results for the June and August 
2001 ‘after’ scans show greater effects for JSA status after one month and also after two 
months than after three months (which is often insignificant).  This hints at the possibility 
that Joint Claims may act to speed exit from JSA for some people but not to have an 
effect on those who would go on to have a longer JSA spell.  However, without further 
observations it is not possible to be more definite about this.   
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 It is notable that some of the perverse early effects on longer-term unemployment remain 
after adjusting for bias in the comparison group.  At first sight, this suggests the 
possibility that those with a greater tendency to prolonged unemployment were more 
likely to convert early.  However, the results in Table 3 provide evidence against this 
since there are no significant differences between unconverted couples and those in the 
comparison group in terms of their unemployment exits.  Furthermore, DiD estimates 
using the full treatment group (ie irrespective of conversion) gave qualitatively similar 
results.6  This provides a further indication that non-random conversion is unlikely to be 
the cause of the early perverse effects on longer-term unemployment.  Indeed, the 
descriptive results in Table 1 show few systematic differences in terms of observable 
characteristics.  An alternative explanation for these early results is that the linear 
functional form of the DiD estimator is not sufficiently flexible to control adequately for 
variation in outcomes associated with observables.  This is returned to below. 
 
The results of estimating the model given in equation (9) are shown in Table 5.  The same 
overall pattern is evident for short-term exits from unemployment.  However, the early 
long-term estimated effects are much more in line with expectations and no significant 
positive effects are evident.  Since these estimates amount to a regression-adjusted 
difference between converted and unconverted couples only, the implication is that the 
positive effects in Table 4 arise from the use of the comparison group in estimating 
effects. 
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< TABLE 5 HERE > 
 
In Table 6, the estimated effects using the matched DiD approach are shown.  The 
propensity score for each combination of scans was calculated using a probit model of 
participation with similar controlling variables to those used in the DiD analysis.  
However, the results of the balancing score test of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) 
suggested that a quadratic term in the length of unemployment should be included.  
Consequently, the set of conditioning variables was expanded to include this additional 
variable.  The results for short-term unemployment exits are qualitatively very similar to 
those already presented.  This provides some reassurance as to the robustness of these 
results.  The results for unemployment exits over the longer-term are more in line with 
expectations in that no significant positive effects were evident.  As noted earlier, this 
may be due to the linear DiD estimator being unduly restrictive in its functional form.  
Since the results shown in Table 5 suggest that plausible results are achieved in the linear 
framework when considering only converted and unconverted couples, the implication is 
that it is when making use of a comparison group that linearity may become over-
restrictive.  Another possibility is that the results in Table 4 were affected by 
compositional changes post-treatment, but that the matched DiD approach addresses this 
by ensuring observable characteristics are balanced. 
 
< TABLE 6 HERE > 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
6 These results are not presented but are available on request. 
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Since the matched DiD estimates are not fully constrained by the functional form of the 
linear DiD estimates, an examination of the sensitivity of the results to the 
inclusion/exclusion of variables was carried out.  The results are presented in Table 7.  
An attempt has been made to keep this sensitivity analysis within manageable proportions 
by concentrating only on those outcomes corresponding to the latest available scan 
(September 2001) while still allowing the pre-Joint Claims scans to vary.  The rationale 
for choosing the latest scan is that the results presented so far suggest that by this point 
the effects of Joint Claims had achieved some stability.  Each column in Table 7 
corresponds to results based on a different set of conditioning variables.  The first column 
is identical to the results in Table 6 since no variables are excluded.  However, in 
subsequent columns, successively more variables are omitted.  The omission is 
cumulative in that the results in one column also exclude the information omitted in the 
previous column.  The final column conditions only on the couples’ JSA history. 
 
< TABLE 7 HERE > 
 
Table 7 shows that the results are fairly robust to a reduction in information; taking 
standard errors into account, the point estimates are not that different from each other.  In 
fact, there appears to be little systematic pattern in the way the estimated effects vary 
with available information, a finding that is unsurprising given the lack of functional 
form restrictions on the observable variables.  However, although the size of the 
estimated effects vary, there is little change in the direction or significance of the results.  
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Overall, it appears that the information set is important although the qualitative 
interpretation of the findings is reasonably robust. 
 
In addition to considering movements away from unemployment, the effect of Joint 
Claims on employment is also of great policy relevance.  However, a limitation of 
administrative records is that destination on unemployment exit is often characterised by 
a large number of missing values.  This results in difficulties when using such data to 
consider transitions into employment.  To address this, estimates of the effect on 
employment are derived under two opposing assumptions; that no unrecorded 
destinations are accounted for by job entry and that all unrecorded destinations are 
accounted for by job entry.  This is a form of sensitivity analysis in that it provides an 
indication of how robust the results are to the assumptions surrounding missing 
destinations information.7   
 
< TABLE 8 HERE > 
 
Table 8 presents the resulting estimates.  These are based on equation (9) and follow a 
similar presentational format to Table 5.  There are two panels in Table 8, corresponding 
to the opposing assumptions regarding missing values.  Overall, Joint Claims appears less 
effective on employment entry than on unemployment exit.  There is little evidence of a 
                                                 
7 These opposing assumptions relating to destinations cannot be regarded as representing bounds on the 
true effect.  Such bounds can be achieved by assuming that no exits to unknown destinations among the 
converted were to employment but all among the unconverted were to employment (lower bound) or vice 
versa for the upper bound.  However, there is little reason to believe a difference exists between the 
converted and unconverted in terms of the proportion of exits to unknown destinations that are accounted 
for by employment.  Consequently, the resulting bounds are very wide and do little to aid the interpretation 
of the results.  These bounds are not presented but are available on request.   
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positive effect on employment in the short-term.  In fact, it is not until the most recent 
‘after’ scan that both panels give a significant positive effect on employment (one month 
later) of between 4 and 10 percentage points.   This suggests that, as with the effect on 
unemployment exit, the effect on employment entry may mature over time.  No 
significant effects on employment after three months are found, and for longer-term 
outcomes the effects are predominantly negative. 
 
Finally, it is interesting to consider the extent to which the apparent employment effect 
has operated through the male or the female partner.  Before Joint Claims, it was most 
commonly the female partner who was economically inactive while the male partner had 
to satisfy the JSA job search requirements.  Since the introduction of Joint Claims had the 
effect of forcing the inactive partner to seek work, the effect was expected to be greater 
for women.  This is examined in Figure 3 which shows the changing proportion of exits 
to employment accounted for by women rather than men finding work.  Only exits within 
three months of the scan date are considered, since this is the period to which the bulk of 
the results already presented relate.  Overall, it is clear that where a couple finds work, it 
is most often the male partner who has done so.  However, the pattern for women is 
interesting.  Most notably, there is a fall in the proportion of jobs accounted for by 
women at a time that roughly corresponds to the introduction of Joint Claims in March 
2001.  This reaches its lowest point in June 2001, after which it rises steadily.  This 
suggests there was a negative effect initially for women but that this disappeared over 
time such that, by the latest period for which data are available, the proportion of jobs 
accounted for by women was comparable to the sort of levels seen before Joint Claims.  
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Combining this finding with the result in Table 8 that the positive effects on employment 
took some time to appear suggests that the employment effect may well have operated 
primarily through the female partner.  It will be interesting to see if this upward trend 
shown in Figure 3 continues as more up to date information becomes available.   
 
< FIGURE 3 HERE > 
 
However, Figure 3 is not directly comparable with the results in Table 8 since it includes 
both stock and flow couples.  The pattern among flow couples is shown in Figure 8.  
Here the trend is less obvious and more volatile.  This reflects the smaller sample size for 
the flow and the consequent higher standard errors associated with the means.  In spite of 
this, there does appear to be a tendency for the exits to employment to be increasingly 
accounted for by female jobs.  In support of this, the proportions in the last three scans 
are all significantly higher than the proportion in March 2001.  This provides further 
support for the belief that the employment effect operated mainly through the female 
partner.   
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, the effect of Joint Claims has been examined using two different 
approaches.  While there were some differences in the size of the estimates, the broad 
patterns revealed were similar, suggesting the results may be robust.  The effect of 
adjusting for bias resulting from a possibly inappropriate comparison group was evident.  
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This is true despite the fact that testing revealed the comparison group to be acceptable 
by and large.  This adjustment was possible due to delays in implementing the legislation.  
In more general applications, such an adjustment may not be possible, so it is reassuring 
that the matched DiD results are comparable to these adjusted results.  It appears 
plausible that matching across the treated and non-treated groups may go some way to 
ensuring the comparison group bears a resemblance to the treated group.  This is an 
important advantage of the approach. 
  
Substantively, the overall results are that Joint Claims appears to have been successful in 
accelerating JSA exit but not necessarily in helping couples to exit worklessness.  There 
was an indication that its main effect was on short-term rates of exit and that longer-term 
exits may be less affected.  Importantly, the effect appears to have evolved over time.  
About five months after the introduction of Joint Claims, significant effects on 
unemployment in the expected direction were detected.  There was also evidence that the 
effect on employment was evolving such that Joint Claims was starting to encourage 
employment entry, at least in the short-term.  Furthermore, there is reason to believe that 
the effect operates largely through the female partner. 
 
The fact that Joint Claims had a greater effect on JSA exit than on entering work implies 
that some couples leaving JSA were either moving onto other benefits or were managing 
without any benefits.  With respect to the latter, since they cannot be observed beyond the 
point of JSA exit, it is not possible to know how long such couples manage without 
receiving a benefit.  It is plausible to believe that a proportion of them will in fact move 
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into employment after some time.  Should this be the case, it appears reasonable to view 
this employment effect as being indirectly attributable to Joint Claims.  While this clearly 
cannot be quantified, it may go some way to helping understand what happens to those 
couples who simply disappear from the unemployment register. 
 
A number of reasons for the effect maturing over time are possible.  Generally, it is not 
uncommon for new interventions to require a period of time to ‘bed-down’.  Qualitative 
research (Fielding et al, 2001) suggests that there was a learning curve for Jobcentre staff 
in coping with Joint Claims clients.  Staff had to deal with a number of cases before they 
could be confident of delivering an effective service.  Aggravating this problem of 
needing to accrue experience of Joint Claims was the fact that the training provided for 
staff often occurred too far in advance of the introduction of the legislation.  The 
consequence of this was that staff may have forgotten much of what they had learned by 
the time they were actually meant to make use of it, and maintaining awareness was 
difficult.  Even identifying when a client would have been eligible for Joint Claims was 
sometimes problematic, particularly for couples where there was a sizeable age difference 
between partners.  Less experienced reception staff would sometimes mistakenly assume 
the client’s partner to be of a similar age and thereby not consider the couple eligible for 
Joint Claims.  The use of temporary reception staff did little to help this problem.  
Fielding et al. (2001) also note that there were deficiencies within the IT systems at the 
time of introduction of Joint Claims and that these persisted for some months thereafter. 
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Finally, it is important to note that one effect of Joint Claims is to ensure that both 
partners within a couple are visible to the JSA process and all that that entails.  A key 
consequence of this is that both partners become eligible for labour market programmes 
when their period of JSA claiming reaches the required duration.  In most cases, this will 
be the New Deal for Young People after a period of six months unemployment.  Hence, 
Joint Claims not only applies the standard JSA incentive to job search, but acts as a 
springboard to other programmes which will then exert their own particular influence. 
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Table 1: Comparing converted and unconverted treatment group couples 
 Type of treatment group couple: Testing 
difference:
Converted Unconverted P-value
Partner 1 age*  23.1 23.8 0.02
Partner 2 age* 21.4 20.9 0.03
Partner 1 disabled (%)* 9.5 16.0 0.00
Partner 2 disabled (%)* 10.0 8.3 0.36
 
Ethnic group of partner 1*:  0.63
White 85.7 82.7 
Black-Caribbean 85.7 82.7 
Black-African 0.6 0.4 
Black-other 0.4 0.4 
Indian 0.6 0.4 
Pakistani 2.8 1.9 
Bangladeshi 4.7 7.4 
Chinese 1.7 2.3 
Other 3.6 4.4 
 
Preferred occupation of partner 1*:  0.02
Managers and senior officials  1.8 2.4 
Professional occupations  1.3 3.8 
Associate professional & technical  6.9 3.8 
Administrative and secretarial  11.6 11.0 
Skilled trades  14.4 16.4 
Personal service  5.8 4.8 
Sales and customer service  15.2 12.4 
Process, plant & machine operatives  8.7 12.6 
Elementary occupations  34.5 32.9 
 
Region:  0.85
Scotland  9.3 7.4 
Northern  6.4 8.3 
North west  14.1 12.9 
Yorkshire and the Humber  11.9 12.3 
Wales  5.7 6.4 
West midlands  12.5 12.5 
East midlands & eastern  10.9 12.5 
South west  10.0 8.9 
London and South East  19.4 18.9 
  
Rural ward (%) 15.5 16.0 0.81
  
Total 562 541 
*Before Joint Claims, partner 1 was the claimant partner.  Joint Claims removed this distinction with the 
consequence that the question of which partner was recorded as partner 1 was arbitrary.   
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Table 2: Regression-adjusted DiD estimates of the effect of Joint Claims on the 
probability of still claiming JSA after X months 
  Date of post-Joint Claims scan (2001) 
 30 Apr 4 Jun 24 Jun 4 Aug 1 Sep 
25 Sep 2000 base  
JSA after 1 month 0.4 3.2 -4.8 -13.1** -11.7** 
  (0.15) (1.21) (1.85) (5.16) (4.08) 
JSA after 2 months 5.9 6.0 -4.6 -8.0* -9.8** 
  (1.85) (1.86) (1.47) (2.53) (2.90) 
JSA after 3 months 8.2* 8.8* -2.5 -2.6 . 
  (2.32) (2.51) (0.73) (0.76) . 
JSA after 4 months 11.2** 10.9** -0.7 . . 
  (3.01) (2.97) (0.20) . . 
JSA after 5 months 12.6** 12.6** 0.4 . . 
  (3.32) (3.41) (0.10) . . 
JSA after 6 months 15.1** . . . . 
  (4.00) . . . . 
27 Nov 2000 base  
JSA after 1 month -1.8 0.3 -7.6** -15.2** -14.3** 
  (0.70) (0.11) (3.04) (6.08) (5.07) 
JSA after 2 months 0.1 -0.9 -11.4** -13.8** -16.1** 
  (0.03) (0.27) (3.67) (4.37) (4.78) 
JSA after 3 months 5.1 4.3 -7.2* -5.5 . 
  (1.46) (1.24) (2.11) (1.65) . 
11 Dec 2000 base  
JSA after 1 month -3.1 -1.0 -8.7** -16.8** -15.6** 
  (1.22) (0.41) (3.60) (7.00) (5.72) 
JSA after 2 months 1.3 0.1 -10.5** -13.0** -15.3** 
  (0.40) (0.03) (3.35) (4.12) (4.54) 
JSA after 3 months 4.0 3.0 -8.8* -7.4* . 
  (1.14) (0.85) (2.53) (2.20) . 
22 Jan 2001 base  
JSA after 1 month -0.3 1.5 -6.5* -14.0** -13.1** 
  (0.13) (0.58) (2.56) (5.57) (4.58) 
* - significant at 5%; ** - significant at 1%.  t-ratios in parentheses.   
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Table 3: Regression-adjusted DiD estimates of the effect of Joint Claims on the 
probability of still claiming JSA after X months for ‘unconverted’ couples 
  Date of post-Joint Claims scan (2001) 
 30 Apr 4 Jun 24 Jun 4 Aug 1 Sep 
25 Sep 2000 base  
JSA after 1 month 3.6 0.5 -1.3 -5.5* 2.1 
  (1.46) (0.19) (0.51) (2.20) (0.75) 
JSA after 2 months 2.8 1.0 -2.9 -0.5 1.1 
  (0.86) (0.30) (0.90) (0.16) (0.32) 
JSA after 3 months 2.7 4.1 -3.7 1.5 . 
  (0.75) (1.14) (1.03) (0.41) . 
JSA after 4 months 2.4 5.5 -2.7 . . 
  (0.61) (1.48) (0.70) . . 
JSA after 5 months 2.9 5.8 -5.0 . . 
  (0.73) (1.52) (1.30) . . 
JSA after 6 months 6.3 . . . . 
  (1.61) . . . . 
27 Nov 2000 base      
JSA after 1 month 3.9 1.2 -1.2 -4.4 3.0 
  (1.65) (0.47) (0.50) (1.82) (1.11) 
JSA after 2 months 0.3 -0.9 -4.8 -1.5 0.5 
  (0.10) (0.28) (1.53) (0.46) (0.14) 
JSA after 3 months 2.5 4.1 -3.9 2.6 . 
  (0.71) (1.15) (1.11) (0.74) . 
11 Dec 2000 base      
JSA after 1 month 2.5 -0.8 -2.6 -6.4** 1.4 
  (1.07) (0.32) (1.13) (2.74) (0.52) 
JSA after 2 months 1.6 -0.1 -3.7 -1.1 1.5 
  (0.50) (0.02) (1.18) (0.34) (0.44) 
JSA after 3 months 2.9 3.8 -4.2 1.9 . 
  (0.81) (1.07) (1.15) (0.54) . 
22 Jan 2001 base      
JSA after 1 month 4.8* 1.3 -1.0 -4.3 2.7 
  (1.97) (0.50) (0.43) (1.75) (0.97) 
* - significant at 5%; ** - significant at 1%.  t-ratios in parentheses. 
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Table 4: Regression-adjusted DiD estimates of the effect of Joint Claims on the 
probability of still claiming JSA after X months, adjusted for comparison group ‘bias’ 
  Date of post-Joint Claims scan (2001) 
 30 Apr 4 Jun 24 Jun 4 Aug 1 Sep 
25 Sep 2000 base  
JSA after 1 month -3.18 2.73 -3.51 -7.67** -13.81** 
  (1.52) (1.11) (1.59) (3.26) (4.99) 
JSA after 2 months 3.12 5.04 -1.76 -7.49** -10.92** 
  (1.12) (1.68) (0.65) (2.67) (3.39) 
JSA after 3 months 5.44 4.76 1.15 -4.06 . 
  (1.80) (1.46) (0.37) (1.29) . 
JSA after 4 months 8.83** 5.33 1.97 . . 
  (2.69) (1.61) (0.57) . . 
JSA after 5 months 9.74** 6.77 5.42 . . 
  (2.92) (1.90) (1.62) . . 
JSA after 6 months 8.80** . . . . 
  (2.74) . . . . 
27 Nov 2000 base  
JSA after 1 month -5.72* -0.94 -6.37** -10.79** -17.27** 
  (2.57) (0.42) (2.89) (4.43) (7.00) 
JSA after 2 months -0.25 0.05 -6.58* -12.29** -16.57** 
  (0.08) (0.02) (2.21) (4.14) (5.27) 
JSA after 3 months 2.53 0.24 -3.24 -8.12** . 
  (0.75) (0.08) (0.97) (2.74) . 
11 Dec 2000 base  
JSA after 1 month -5.51** -0.22 -6.07** -10.42** -16.98** 
  (2.70) (0.10) (2.72) (4.31) (6.42) 
JSA after 2 months -0.37 0.18 -6.73* -11.93** -16.86** 
  (0.12) (0.06) (2.46) (4.03) (5.36) 
JSA after 3 months 1.07 -0.86 -4.63 -9.32** . 
  (0.32) (0.28) (1.42) (3.02) . 
22 Jan 2001 base  
JSA after 1 month -5.09* 0.19 -5.43* -9.74** -15.72** 
  (2.30) (0.08) (2.55) (4.22) (6.52) 
* - significant at 5%; ** - significant at 1%.  t-ratios in parentheses based on bootstrapped standard errors 
with 250 replications.  
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Table 5: Regression-adjusted mean difference estimates of the effect of Joint Claims on 
the probability of still claiming JSA after X months 
  Date of post-Joint Claims scan (2001) 
 30 Apr 4 Jun 24 Jun 4 Aug 1 Sep 
JSA after 1 month -5.64** -0.01 -5.36* -10.48** -15.69** 
  (2.65) (0.01) (2.19) (4.26) (5.75) 
JSA after 2 months -2.36 1.21 -4.24 -12.26** -13.65** 
  (0.80) (0.39) (1.38) (3.94) (3.92) 
JSA after 3 months 0.90 1.09 -1.82 -8.42* . 
  (0.27) (0.32) (0.53) (2.46) . 
JSA after 4 months 3.55 2.96 0.42 . . 
  (0.97) (0.82) (0.12) . . 
JSA after 5 months 4.68 5.89 5.14 . . 
  (1.20) (1.57) (1.39) . . 
JSA after 6 months 5.01 . . . . 
  (1.25) . . . . 
* - significant at 5%; ** - significant at 1%.  t-ratios in parentheses. 
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Table 6: Matched DiD estimates of the effect of Joint Claims on the probability of still 
claiming JSA after X months  
  Date of post-Joint Claims scan (2001) 
 30 Apr 4 Jun 24 Jun 4 Aug 1 Sep 
25 Sep 2000 base  
JSA after 1 month -5.74 -5.88 -3.77 -14.26** -16.47** 
 (1.21) (1.20) (0.82) (3.26) (3.50) 
JSA after 2 months -5.08 -0.39 -13.64* -14.56** -12.86* 
 (0.86) (0.07) (2.41) (2.57) (2.27) 
JSA after 3 months -2.87 1.76 -9.34 -11.71 . 
 (0.45) (0.27) (1.49) (1.91) . 
JSA after 4 months 4.64 4.90 -0.18 . . 
 (0.69) (0.73) (0.03) . . 
JSA after 5 months 2.65 5.29 3.95 . . 
 (0.39) (0.78) (0.59) . . 
JSA after 6 months 6.40 . . . . 
 (0.95) . . . . 
27 Nov 2000 base      
JSA after 1 month -4.86 1.79 -9.82* -16.36** -13.83** 
 (1.08) (0.40) (2.34) (4.03) (3.10) 
JSA after 2 months -2.87 -0.20 -16.00** -9.70 -11.97* 
 (0.50) (0.04) (3.01) (1.78) (2.17) 
JSA after 3 months 3.31 6.37 -8.36 -0.45 . 
 (0.53) (1.04) (1.41) (0.08) . 
11 Dec 2000 base      
JSA after 1 month -4.64 0.78 -8.44* -17.33** -16.92** 
 (1.09) (0.18) (2.14) (4.41) (3.94) 
JSA after 2 months -0.66 1.36 -16.34** -8.59 -14.93** 
 (0.11) (0.24) (3.04) (1.53) (2.65) 
JSA after 3 months 5.08 1.75 -10.41 -3.56 . 
 (0.79) (0.28) (1.73) (0.58) . 
22 Jan 2001 base      
JSA after 1 month -3.53 -0.59 -8.11 -13.06** -16.25** 
 (0.79) (0.13) (1.87) (3.08) (3.55) 
* - significant at 5%; ** - significant at 1%.  t-ratios in parentheses based on analytical approximations that 
regard the propensity score as fixed.  These were calculated using the following variance formula  
Var (
∧α MDiD ) = (1 / N2) Var (Y | T, t ) +  (1 / N2)  x  
{ ∑ w
>0j
j
2 Var (Y | T, τ, wj > 0 ) + w∑
>0k
k
2 Var (Y | C, t, wk > 0 ) + ∑
>0l
wl2 Var (Y | T, τ, wl > 0 ) } 
where N is the number of treated couples and wj, wk and wl are the matching weights for those in the pre-
Joint Claims treatment group, the post-Joint Claims comparison group and the pre-Joint Claims comparison 
group respectively. 
 52
Table 7: Matched DiD estimates of the effect of Joint Claims on the probability of still 
claiming JSA after X months using the September 1, 2001 ‘post’ scan: the effect of 
varying the information set 
  Information omitted from conditioning set: 
 None Disab’ty Rural 
area 
region Ethnic 
group 
Pref. 
Occup. 
Local 
unemp. 
25 Sep 2000 base   
JSA after 1 month -16.47** -19.19** -21.91** -16.36** -27.53** -17.54** -19.09* 
 (3.50) (4.06) (4.53) (3.40) (5.85) (3.72) (2.44) 
JSA after 2 months -12.86* -17.17** -19.73** -14.38* -22.06** -18.36** -23.98* 
 (2.27) (3.01) (3.38) (2.47) (3.88) (3.23) (2.51) 
27 Nov 2000 base        
JSA after 1 month -13.83** -16.97** -20.53** -12.27** -18.46** -20.55** -11.46 
 (3.10) (3.79) (4.57) (2.71) (4.16) (4.68) (1.49) 
JSA after 2 months -11.97* -18.64** -19.87** -13.58* -15.36** -16.80** -14.08 
 (2.17) (3.37) (3.58) (2.42) (2.80) (3.10) (1.45) 
11 Dec 2000 base        
JSA after 1 month -16.92** -18.60** -10.60* -13.70** -16.45** -19.02** -16.10* 
 (3.94) (4.23) (2.44) (3.17) (3.83) (4.60) (2.30) 
JSA after 2 months -14.93** -14.19* -8.65 -7.83 -15.64** -11.54* -7.64 
 (2.65) (2.45) (1.52) (1.39) (2.77) (2.13) (0.80) 
22 Jan 2001 base        
JSA after 1 month -16.25** -15.70** -13.28** -11.56* -16.45** -12.52** -14.66 
 (3.55) (3.37) (2.84) (2.52) (3.64) (2.83) (1.91) 
* - significant at 5%; ** - significant at 1%.  t-ratios in parentheses based on analytical 
approximations that regard the propensity score as fixed – see footnote to Table 6 for variance formula.  
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Table 8: Regression-adjusted mean difference estimates of the effect of Joint Claims on 
the probability of at least one partner working after X months 
  Date of post-Joint Claims scan (2001) 
 30 Apr 4 Jun 24 Jun 4 Aug 1 Sep 
Assuming none of those leaving to 
unknown destinations enter work 
    
Emp after 1 month 3.56** -1.22 1.34 1.98 4.32* 
  (2.72) (0.81) (0.91) (1.38) (2.42) 
Emp after 2 months 0.63 -3.44 2.39 0.81 2.61 
  (0.31) (1.65) (1.28) (0.36) (1.15) 
Emp after 3 months -2.29 -4.43 0.72 -0.74 . 
  (0.98) (1.91) (0.33) (0.29) . 
Emp after 4 months -3.55 -7.55** -3.64 . . 
  (1.39) (2.84) (1.37) . . 
Emp after 5 months -6.03* -9.85** -6.03* . . 
  (2.12) (3.36) (1.99) . . 
Emp after 6 months -8.29** . . . . 
  (2.64) . . . . 
       
Assuming all of those leaving to 
unknown destinations enter work 
    
Emp after 1 month  3.44 -0.65 3.05 2.70 10.08** 
  (1.86) (0.29) (1.44) (1.27) (4.38) 
Emp after 2 months  -0.13 -3.50 0.43 -0.16 5.67 
  (0.05) (1.26) (0.16) (0.06) (1.89) 
Emp after 3 months  -4.38 -4.29 -2.88 -2.53 . 
  (1.49) (1.41) (0.95) (0.80) . 
Emp after 4 months  -7.37* -6.46 -8.02* . . 
  (2.26) (1.94) (2.39) . . 
Emp after 5 months  -12.28** -9.99** -12.93** . . 
  (3.44) (2.83) (3.56) . . 
Emp after 6 months  -13.36** . . . . 
  (3.44) . . . . 
* - significant at 5%; ** - significant at 1%.  t-ratios in parentheses. 
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